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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

OSCAR HACKFORD,
Plaintiff,

Case No.

vs.

9330

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,
Defendant.

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF

STATEMENT
On December 31, 19 57, the Plaintiff was employed as a sheepherder by the Deseret Livestock Company, and while in the course of his employment a
team of horses ran away, throwing him to the ground
and the wheels of a wagon ran over his body and frac-
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tured his spine, and otherwise bruising his body (R.
1).
Immediately after the accident he was taken to
the hospital at Tooele, Utah, and there treated by
Dr. Johnson. After his release from the hospital,
about ten weeks later, he was placed under the care
of the company physician, Dr. A. M. Okelberry, at
Salt Lake City, where he received further treatment
until about April, 1959. The employer, being a selfinsurer, paid Plaintiff $100 per month compensation
during this period.
In May, 1959, the employer stopped paying
compensation and Plaintiff, not being able to work,
requested permission from the Defendant to change
doctors (R. 5). This request was denied (R. 6), and
on July 6, a formal, verified application was filed with
the Defendant praying that it determine his claim and
award relief (R. 7, 8). On May 16, 1960, a bearing
was had on this application (R. 24-59). On June
16, 1960, the Defendant rendered its decision (R. 6 L
62). On July 7, Plaintiff filed his motion for a rehearing (R. 63), which re-hearing was denied (R.
64).
From the order denying a re-hearing and the decision of the Commission, Plaintiff obtained a writ of
review from this Court.
To reverse the Commission, Plaintiff assign the
following:
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1. Error of the Commission in denying Plaintiff the right to change doctors.

2. Error of the Commission in prejudging the
merits of this case.

3. Error of Commissioner W eisley in acting as
Referee without being appointed by the Commission,
in writing, so to do.
4. Error of the Referee in receiving in evidence
the reports of Dr. A. M. Okelberry.
5. Error of the Referee in receiving in evidence
the report of the medical panel.

6. Error of the Commission in denying Plaintiff's motion for a re-hearing.
7. The decision of the Commission is contrary
to the evidence.

8.
to law.

The decision of the Commission is contrary

9.
in law.

The award of the Commission is inadequate

To sustain the writ, Plaintiff makes the following:
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POINTS
I.
NO PERSON SHALL BE DEPRIVED OF
LIFE, LIBERTY, OR PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
II.
THE COMMISSION MAY NOT ACT ARBITRARILY OR EX PARTE IN DECIDING
A COMPENSATION CASE.
III.
THE AWARD IS CONTRARY TO THE
EVIDENCE AND THE LAW.
IV.
EQUITY WILL PROVIDE A REMEDY
WHERE NONE EXIST AT LAW.
ARGUMENT

I.
NO PERSON SHALL BE DEPRIVED OF
LIFE, LIBERTY, OR PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
U. S. Constitution, Amendment 14
Utah Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 7
U tab Code, 19 53, Sec. 3 5-1-31
The 14th Amendment to the U. S. Constitution
provides:
"Nor shall any state deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law."
Article I, Section 7, Utah Constitution, provides:
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
For the purpose of administering the Workmen's
Compensation Act, Section 35-1-31, Utah Code,
1953, provides:
''The Commission shall have power to appoint, by an order in writing, any member of
the Commission, or any other competent person who is a resident of this state, as an agent,
whose duties shall be prescribed in such order,
for the purpose of making any investigations
with regard to any employment or place of employment.''
Nowhere in the entire record is there any order
of the Commission appointing Chairman, Otto A.
Weisley as Referee to investigate this case and prescribing his duties therein. The proceedings and hearing
in this case were conducted by Otto A. Weisley, as
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Referee (R. 24). The record further shows that all
other action taken in this case was taken by Otto A.
Weisley as Chairman. The Commission not having
appointed Otto A. Weisley as Referee by written order
and prescribing his duties therein, his actions herein
are a complete nullity, and the decision of the Commission, based thereon, is a violation of the constitutional provisions cited above.

II.
THE COMMISSION MAY NOT ACT ARBITRARILY OR EX PARTE IN DECIDING
A COMPENSATION CASE.
Utah Code, 1953, Sec. 35-1-77
Utah Fuel Co. v. Ind. Comm., 194 P. 22
Spencer v. Comm., 40 P. 2d 188
Ocean Guarantee Co. v. Ind. Comm., 245
P. 343
Pruno v. Comm., 204 N. W. 576
Mining Co. V. Comm., 240 P. 440
In Ocean Guarantee Co. v. Comm., (supra), this
court said:
''Rules promulgated by the Commission
must not, of course, deprive the parties of their
Constitutional ri.ght of having their day in
court and of havtng the cause determined after
(not before) an impartial hearing. u

Pruno v. Ind. Comm., (supra), is a Nebraska
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case wherein the rule is stated with the following language:
"The Industrial Commission is a quasijudicial body, and is supposed to stand as an
impartial tribunal, and no partisan activity on
its part towards a claimant is required; its duty
being to make investigations, find the facts according to the weight of evidence, and apply the
law fairly and justly."

Mining Co. v. Ind. Comm., (supra), is another
Utah case wherein this court said:
''From the language used in the act, 1t 1s
clear that the Commission has not the power,
and it was not intended to have the power, to
dispose of any application for compensation
pending before it, except upon the merits unless
the application is dismissed or withdrawn by
the applicant himself."

Utah Fuel Company v. Industrial Commission,
(supra), states:
"Every administrative body, if it is to
function at all, must have some power and jurisdiction to determine for itself whether or not
it may proceed in a given case, and this we think
niay be done without usurping the functions of
the courts, so long as it does not act arbitrarily.,
In Spencer v. Comm., (supra), this court said at
page 197:
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"Whether an employee is totally or permanently disabled are ultimate matters to be
decided by the Commission, as is also the
amount and time compensation maY be
awarded upon all the evidence. Upon these
ultimate questions, expert witnesses may ~ot
properly express opinions, nor may such opinions relating to loss of bodily functions become
a measure of compensable functions possessed
by an employee prior to his injury.
"A claim for compensation may not be
denied because a new injury 'lighted up, reopened, or revived an existing infirmity of the injured employee.' "
Section 3 5-1-7 7, U tab Code, 19 53, provides,
among other things:
"If objections to such report are filed it
shall be the duty of the Commission to set the
case for hearing within thirty days to determine
the facts and issues involved * * * Upon
such hearing the written report of the panel may
be received in evidence as an exhibit, but shall
not be considered as evidence in the case except
insofar as it is sustained by the testimony admitted.''
On June 15, 19 59, Plain tiff wrote the Commission requesting permission to change doctors (R. 5) .
The Commission sent a copy of that letter to the employer and on June 17, 1959, the employer's attorney
wrote the Commission a letter (R. 4), objecting to the
change, and pursuant thereto the Commission denied

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9
the request (R. 6). On July 6, 1959, Plaintiff filed
his verified application with the Commission praying
that his claim be determined by the Commission (R.
7, 8). A copy of this application, together with some
type of form, was forwarded to the employer, and
on July 15, 19 59, the employer's attorney wrote the
Commission (R. 11, 12), calling its attention to a report of Dr. A. M. Okelberry, ( R. 9, 10) , and claiming that the acts of the Plaintiff were responsible for
his condition, and thereupon, on July 21, 1959, the
Commission wrote Plaintiff's attorney (S. R. 2), advising him, among other things:
HYour allegations that the applicant is
totally and permanently disabled is entirely
without foundation in fact or in law."
Thus, Plaintiff's cause was decided without a
hearing.
In reply to the Commission's letter of July 21,
on July 27, Plaintiff's attorney wrote the Commission
insisting that a hearing be had (R. 13, 14), and thereupon, on August 11, 1959, the Commission appointed
a medical panel to examine Plaintiff (R. 16), and on
Sept. 21, 19 59, the panel met and, under the influence
of the Commission Chairman, Otto A. Weisley, examined the Plaintiff and made its report (R. 17-19).
This report was not made under oath or the panel
members sworn in regard thereto.
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On October 6, 1959, the Commission notified
Plaintiff of the filing of th~ panel report (S. R. 4),
and on October 20, 1959, the Plaintiff filed his objections to the panel report (R. 20). There the matter rested without anything·whatsoever being done by
the Commission, and after repeated telephone calls and
personal visits to the Commission's office, by counsel,
on February 23, 1960, the Commission wrote Plaintiff's attorney a letter (R. 21) in which it said:
"Your objections to the medical panel report are not well taken. Your client was given
a thorough examination by a panel of orthopedic specialists. The conclusion could not be
more definite and certain. The rating is adequate. Your client cannot possibly be rated
permanently and totally disabled. * * *"
Here again the Commission decided the merits of
this case without a hearing and without evidence being
taken, and in violation of the rule enunciated in the
above-cited cases and statutes and in violation of due
process of law.
III.
THE AWARD IS CONTRARY TO THE
EVIDENCE AND THE LAW.
Utah Constitution, Art I, Sec. 11
Utah Code, 1953, Sec. 35-1-45
Utah Code, 1953, Sec. 35-1-67
Utah Code, 1953, Sec. 35-1-77
Spencer v. Comm., 40 P. 2nd 188
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Ocean Guar. Co. v. Comm., 245 P. 343
Ellis V. Comm., 64 P. 2nd 1303
Section 3 5-1-4 5 provides:
"Every employee mentioned in 35-1-35,
who is injured * * * by accident arising
out of or in the course of his employment,
wheresoever such injury occurred, provided the
same was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be
entitled to receive, and shall receive, and shall
be paid, such compensation for loss sustained on
account of such injury or death, and such
amount for medical, nurse, and hospital services
and medicine * * * as herein provided.''
Section 3 5-1-6 7, provides:
"In cases of permanent total disability, the
award shall be 60 percent of the average weekly
wages for five years from the date of injury,
and thereafter 45 percent of such average weekly
wages, but not to exceed a maximum of $27.50
per week and not less than $17. 50 per week.
* * * Where the employee has tentatively
been found to be permanently and totally disabled, it shall be mandatory that the Industrial
Commission of U tab refer such employee to the
division of vocational rehabilitation under the
board of education for rehabilitation, etc."
On March 31, 1960, Plaintiff's counsel advised
the Commission of the provisions of Section 3 5-1-7 7,
and requested the Commission to grant or deny a hearing (R. 22); thereupon the Commission set the hearing for May 16, 1960 (R. 23). There is no showing
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in the record to justify this prolonged delay and therefore Article I. Section 1 L Utah Constitution was violated by unnecessary delay.
On June 16, 1960, the Commission rendered its
decision (R. 61), based upon the reports of Dr. A.
M. Okelberry, which reports were forwarded to it by
the employer prior to the hearing, (see Point II). The
Plaintiff was not furnished with copies of these reports
or notified of their being filed with the Commission.
They were not introduced in evidence at the hearing
and the Plaintiff, nor his attorney, had no knowledge
of them, whatsoever, until they were discovered in the
record on file herein after receipt thereof from the
Clerk of this Court. Citation of authority should not
be necessary to hold that the consideration of these reports by the Commission is reversible error.
The report of the medical panel was received in
evidence without a foundation being laid therefor and
over the objection of Plaintiff (R. 50, 51).
The rules of evidence require the party relying
on certain evidence to introduce it in evidence. The
employer's counsel was present at the hearing (R. 24),
but he did not introduce this report in evidence. The
Referee, being an impartial arbiter, (supposedly), had
no right to introduce it. Section 35-1-77 expressly
provides that such report,
''shall not be considered as evidence in the case
except insofar as it is sustained by the testimony
admitted.''
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There is no evidence in the entire record that says
anything about the qualifications of the members of
the panel or their authority to practice their professions
in Utah, and the Referee erred in receiving the same in
evidence and basing his decisions thereon.
The Plaintiff testified in his own behalf (R. 4251), the substance of which is that he has not been able
to work since the date of the accident. His testimony
is corroborated by three other lay witnesses (R. 5259), none of which are contradicted anywhere in the
record; assuming, but not admitting, that the reports
of all the doctors were properly admitted in evidence,
they don't claim that Plaintiff was able to work. All
they say is that he has a 15/'o loss of bodily function.
Dr. Stobbe testified (R. 32):

Q. "In your opinion, is Mr. Hackford
able to work? Do any kind of labor?"
A. "I don't think he's physically fit for
any physical job."
On cross-examination (R. 34),

Q. "When you say, 'take for granted',
what do you mean by that? You make an assumption that may or may not be true, is that
right?''
A. "When you have a degenerative process existing, I would not be in a position to say
when it got started. But, with a history of being run over by a wagon, when anything of
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that kind * * * even if it were present
before * * * it would certainly be aggravated by the injury. By the accident."
Dr~ Hugh Wayman testified on behalf of Plaintiff
(R. 35-41); he found a misalignment of the spine and
that condition was existing on the date of the hearing,
and at (R. 40), he said:

"The accident you speak of could cause
this misalignment.''
Nowhere in the entire record is this testimony
disputed, and yet the Commission refused to consider
it (R. 61).
In Spencer v. Commission, this Court said:
"The Commission may not, without cause
or reason, arbitrarily or capriciously refuse to
believe and to act upon creditable evidence
which is unquestioned and undisputed."
In Ellis v. Commission, this Court said:
"A chiropractor may treat injured workmen in this state, and under the Workmen's
Compensation Act of this state, they are entitled to be paid for their services the same as
any other doctor . .,
The Spencer case is directly applicable here and
expressly holds that bodily function is not the basis
upon which compensation is awarded in Utah, but the
ability to work is the criterion and this must be de-
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termined by the Commission (not experts) , from all
the evidence.
Section 3 5-1-4 5 provides for medical, hospital,
nursing care and medicine. Section 3 5-1-6 7 provides
for. compensation as such. The Plaintiff was earning
$250 per month at the time of the injury (R. 1), and
at the time of the decision, had been unable to work
for 128 ·weeks, and under the provisions of these statutes, he was entitled to 128 weeks' compensation at
the rate of $3 7.50 per week, or $4800, less any
amount paid by the employer, plus medical expenses
and rehabilitation cost, and as yet, no effort has been
made by the Commission to rehabilitate Plaintiff.
There is no evidence in the record even indicating
that Plaintiff is recovered from the injury sufficiently
to work or to indicate when he will be able to work,
and for this reason the Commission had no authority
to arbitrarily fix his compensation at $35.00 per week
for thirty weeks (R. 62), all of which denied Plaintiff
the equal protection of law guaranteed by the constitution.

IV.
EQUITY WILL PROVIDE A REMEDY
WHERE NONE EXIST AT LAW.
Lamken V. Miller~ 44 Pac. 2nd 190
Mirror Co. v. L. A. County, 44 Pac. 2nd
547
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School District v. Pirie, 46 Pac. 2nd 10 5
R. R. Co. v. Bouvier, 62 A. 868
Theis v. Spokane Co., 74 Pac. 1004
Alexander v. Hillman, 75 F. 2nd 451
"Where remedy at law is clearly inadequate, equity will intervene.tt Lamken V. Miller, supra.
·'Equity does not wait upon precedent
which actually squares with the facts in controversy, but will exert itself in those situations
when right and justice would be defeated but
for its intervention." Mirror Co. v. Los Angeles County, supra.
·'Equity meets all conditions for human
ingenuity, and human affairs cannot create conditions which the long arm of Equity Courts
cannot reach if injustice or wrong would otherwise result." School District v. Pirie, supra.
·'Equity is a better sort of justice
corrects legal injustice, where the latter
through being expressed in a universal
not taking account of particular cases."
road Co. v. Bouvier, supra.

which
errors
form,
Rail-

"A court of equity will never aid in the
perpetuation of a fraud simply because application is made in e~~ty form of law. Its pow~rs are not so superftctal or ~o restricted. Equity
ts, we are told, the correctton of that wherein
the law, by reason of its universality, is deficient." Theis v. Spokane Co., supra.
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HCourts of equity may suit proceedings and
remedies to circumstances of cases and formulate
them appropriately to safeguard, conveniently
to adjudge and promptly to enforce substantial
rights of all parties before them." Alexander v.
Hillman, supra.
We have pointed out in this brief wherein the
Commission had made up its mind on the merits of
this case long before the hearing was held on May 16,
1960, and the arbitrary award made by the Commission in total disregard of the statutes and evidence is
further evidence of that prejudice and by reason of
which the Commission is disqualified to act in this
case. There is no provision in the Workmen's Compensation Act for a change of Venue in the event of
the disqualification of the Commission, and in this
we respectfully submit that this Court, in the exercise
of its equity powers, provide an impartial arbiter for
the Plaintiff in this cause.
CONCLUSION
We have pinpointed the unfairness and partiality
of the Commission in handling this case: we have
shown wherein it has acted capriciously and arbitrarily in denying the Plaintiff the compensation and
relief to which he is entitled under the statutes, and
we have pointed out the lack of any provision in the
statutes for a change of Venue whenever the Commission is disqualified to act, and in this we respectfully
submit that this court, in the exercise of its equity
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powers, set aside the award made by the Commission
and award Plaintiff the relief to which he is entitled
under the statute or in the alternative direct the Commission· to make such a ward and for such other and
further relief as to this Court seems just and equitable
in the premises.
Respectfully submitted,

D. H. OLIVER,
Attorney for Plaintiff.

138 South 2nd East,
Salt Lake City II, Utah.
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